What is the ontological status of māyā? Is it in brahman? Or is it a second vastu? If it is anirvacanīya (i.e. sad-asad-vilakṣaṇa) then it is different from sad (brahman). Does that make it a second vastu?
From āvarta 332 onwards, the nature of deśa & kāla are discussed. They are the cause of creation, but is the cause inherent to them? These arguments apply to māyā as well.
ब्रह्म सकलप्रपञ्चकारणं, तन्निष्ठं कारणत्वं एव देशकालयोः प्रतीयते। न तु देशकालयोः स्वतः विद्यते। . . .। देशकालयोः कारणत्वं नास्ति, किन्तु ब्रह्मणि एव कारणत्वं अस्ति। तच्च ब्रह्मनिष्ठं कारणत्वं केशकालयोः प्रतीयते।
brahma is the kāraṇa of all creation, and this kāraṇatva is seen in deśa and kāla. They do not exist independently in deśa and kāla.
But why is this important? The siddhānta accepts anirvacanīya khyāti. The pūrvapakṣī levels an ākṣepa at the siddhānta, since the kāraṇatvam in deśa and kāla can result in a second entity apart from brahman. If instead, the siddhānta accepts kāraṇatvam in brahman and not in deśa, kāla etc, then they will have to accept anyathā khyāti. Thus there will be a contradiction in the khyāti vāda of the siddhānta. But there is no contradiction, and we accept both khyātis, as appropriate, for different dharmas in the same mithyā vastu.
स्वाप्नमिथ्यापदार्थेषु सत्यताप्रतीतिरपि अन्यथाख्यातिरेव। तत्र अनिर्वचनीयसत्ययोत्पत्त्यङ्गीकारस्तु “सत्यमिदं वस्तु मिथ्या” इति व्याहतावचनवद् असङ्गतः। . . . स्वप्नाधिष्ठानचैतन्यगतसत्यता एव मिथ्यापदार्थे प्रतीयते इति मिथ्यापदार्थनिष्ठसत्यताविषयकज्ञानं अपि अन्यथाख्यातिः इत्येव अङ्गीक्रियते। एवमेव अधिष्ठानब्रह्मनिष्ठकारणता देशकालयोः अन्यथाख्यातिरीत्या एव प्रतिभाति।
The satyatā in all mithyāpadārthas is through anyathā khyāti. Otherwise, how can any mithyā padārtha have any kind of satyatā? The sentence itself would be a contradiction. In the same way, even the dharma of kāraṇatā belongs to brahman alone and not to deśa or kāla. But this too will be said to be anirvacanīya as well from the pāramārthika dr̥ṣṭi …
मायाकृत-अनिर्वचनीय-देशकालौ अनिर्वचीयकारणत्ववन्तौ भवतः। परमार्थतस्तु देशकालयोः नास्ति कारणता। … इत्थं उचितदेशकालरूपसामग्रिम् अन्तरेणैव जाग्रत्प्रपञ्चः उत्पद्यते। अतो जाग्रदपि स्वप्नवत् मिथ्यैव।
In an earlier avarta on māyā svarūpa, it’s āśraya was explicitly said to be śuddha caitanya. And māyā is no different from ajñāna – both are names for the same vastu.
जीवेश्वरादिविभागशून्य-शुद्धचैतन्याश्रिता माया। . . . अज्ञानं माया इति च एकमेव वस्तु उच्यते। अद्वैतमते सदसद्विलक्षणमेव वस्तु मिथ्या इति, अनिर्वचनीयं इति च कथ्यते। तस्मान्मायातत्कार्याभ्यां न द्वैतं सिद्ध्येत्। . . .। न हि मिथ्यापदार्थेन द्वैतसिद्धिर्भवति।
What is the relationship between ajñāna / māyā and adhyāsa? This is described in avarta 97 – ajñāna itself is the cause of ajñāna-adhyāsa, and prapañca-adhyāsa. How can ajñāna be the cause of it’s own adhyāsa as well as the adhyāsa of it’s effects? Through sva-para-nirvāhakatva, i.e. just as a lamp illumines itself and objects around it.
प्रपश्चाध्यासकारणं अज्ञानं, अज्ञानाध्यासस्य तु न किञ्चित् कारणान्तरमस्ति। . . . दीपो यथा स्वयमेव प्रकाशमानः सन् स्वसंबद्धानितरान् च पदार्थान् स्वपरनिर्वाहकत्वात् इतरानपेक्षं प्रकाशयति, तथाऽज्ञानमपि स्वस्य स्वकार्यप्रपञ्चस्य चाध्यासकारणं भवतीति।